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ARTICLE

Metaphoric Recursiveness and Ternary Ontology:
Another Look at the Language and Worldview of the Yaminahua
Carlos A. Segovia
Saint Louis University, Madrid Campus
SPAIN

Introduction
My purpose in this paper is, first, to explore metaphorical recursiveness in Yaminahua, i.e.,
the latter’s folding of the common binary structure (x) things + (y) words into the threefold
scheme: (A) things + (B) external analogies + (C) internal metaphors, as displaying a multi
iconic regime of signs of the type A ≈ [B] ≈ C, which is finally reduced to an indexical:
A ← [B]. This is contra Graham Townsley’s dismissal of semiotic theory—understood as
the theory of sign production and the sign-based cultural codes that generate specific signfunctions (Eco 1976:3–5)—as being, in contrast to cognitive construction, of no relevance in
the making of the “twisted” rhetoric distinctive of Yaminahua shamanism. I undertake this
exploration in the second section. I aim also to show that within the traditional Yaminahua
worldview “animism,” “totemism,” and “analogism”—which Philippe Descola (2013) has
famously described as alternative ontologies—have not only coexisted but also structurally
intertwined in a complex ternary system. This system supports, on the one hand, the basal
binary logic characteristic of most Amazonian ontologies, and correlates, on the other hand,
with the fourfold intersecting structure that has traditionally made possible the integration of
the Yaminahua people into the four dimensions of space, time, society, and the cosmos.
This, in turn, is my argument in the third section. Both sections, therefore, play with numerical notions (and basically with the same numerical notions: 2 and 3) to thereby decipher a
fundamental aspect in the linguistic and ontological grammar of this specific Pano group of
Bolivia, Brasil, and Peru. I endeavor to contribute to recovering the richness and complexity
of the language and the traditional worldview of a people – regretfully like most in Amazonia
– endangered by today’s neocolonialism and neoextractivism; for as Blaser (2013:548) puts it,
in our world all conceptual issues are (rather) “politicoconceptual (one word).”

Metaphorical Recursiveness or the Ternary Folding of Language and Reality
The Amazon basin is home to more than 350 languages, which are commonly grouped into
six major linguistic families: Arawak, Tupi, Carib, Panoan, Tucanoan, and Macro-Jê, plus
around a dozen minor linguistic families and some isolated languages. Yet this extraordinary
variety represents but a fraction of the even-greater multiplicity of Amazonian languages
predating the European invasion, which may have been “as high as 1,200 or as low as 600”
(Aikhenvald 2012:21). (Put otherwise: the percentage ratio of European linguistic ethnocide
amounts to ~75% at worst, ~50% at best.) Yaminahua, in turn, belongs to the Panoan linguistic family. This family comprises more than thirty languages, of which fewer than twenty
are still spoken today, and may have originated in northern Bolivia (Aikhenvald 2012:43;
Fleck 2013). Yaminahua speakers (fewer than 1,000) can be found today at the intersection
of Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru, i.e., along the territory appropriated by these three modern states
in what are now officially the Bolivian department of Pando, the Peruvian departments of
Madre de Dios and Ucayali, and the state of Acre in Brazil.
A preliminary remark on the special qualities of Amazonian languages and their seemingly unrepresentable yet experienceable worlds is nonetheless in order before we narrow
our focus on Yaminahua language.1
It has been argued that “the Amazon basin is the least known and least understood linguistic region in the world” (Dixon and Aikhenvald 1999:1). In fact, Amazonian languages
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represent a major challenge not only to any project to establish universal linguistic principles
but also to any attempt at defining what is susceptible to fall under the category “language”
and, therefore, what is possible in terms of language and ultimately what human language is
(Epps and Salanova 2013:1). In the first place, many Amazonian languages can be defined as
polysynthetic, which means they both present an ultra-agglutinative morphology and are ultrasynthetic in conceptual terms, the latter to an extreme that is hard for us to even fancy;
thus, for instance, a single verb in Amuesha, an Arawak language “from” Peru (viz. the verb
ø-omaz-amy-eɁt-ampy-es-y-e.s-n-e.n-a), means: “They are going downriver by canoe in the late afternoon stopping often along the way” (Aikhenvald 2012:129). Similarly puzzling is that in
some languages like Iatê, a Macro-Gê variant, nominal phrases and even nouns have grammatical tense (i.e., they can be specified as naming something past or future), while nouns
can be further specified considering their degree of reality (a “former house” being different
from “what could have [merely] been a house,” for instance [Aikhenvald 2012:385]). It
should also be noted that in Pirahã, from the Mura-Pirahã language family, the very language
can be spoken, sang, or whistled (Everet 2008:182, 185–86, 189), whereas many languages
(e.g., Pastaza Quichua) have abundant (~ 1,000) “ideophones,” i.e., “a class of words that
communicate through imitative simulations the vivid impressions of sensory experience . . .
including bodily processes, configurations, cognitive capacities, movements, sounds, and
proprioceptions,” as well as nonhuman “reaction[s] to being acted upon by humans” (Nuckolls 2012:3) which, furthermore, can eventually transform into verbs (Faust and Loos
2002:26, 111; see also Nuckolls 1996, 2010; Kohn 2013:8, 31, 118; Nuckolls et al. 2015).2
Among other transformations one also finds causative suffixes that shift into intensifiers and
vice versa (Aikhenvald 2012:241). Although more could be added to this short list of remarkable features (for an overview, see Aikhenvald 2012:382–91), one may note too that
Karajá, another Macro-Gê language, has a phonological gender-based speech distinction,
whereas in Kadiwéu, a southern Circum-Amazonian language belonging to the Guaicuruan
family, men and women often use different words for the same things (Aikhenvald
2012:375). Lastly, I would like to emphasize that Panoan languages—to which Yaminahua
belongs— present “striking morphological possibilities” (Fleck 2013:43) and cases of clausechaining that are “unique in the world” (Aikhenvald 2012:344; cf. Fleck 2013:44). Sadly
many of the linguistic peculiarities of the Amazonian languages (when not the languages
themselves) face today the peril of extinction due both to Christian missionary activity and
state-sponsored education. Thus, for example, the Arawak Palikur “had a special vocabulary
they would use when fishing so as to “mislead” the evil spirits and avoid an attack from
them [but w]ith the advent of Christianity—and the loss of fear of evil spirits—this register
is all but gone” (Aikhenvald 2012:365); and among the Panoan languages only twelve out of
the thirty-two are still spoken today on a daily basis (Fleck 2013:9). As for the modern education “offered” by the state, one wonders—to put it mildly—whether basic botanic
knowledge relative, say, to the parts of plants is of any help for peoples who have developed
their own, far richer taxonomies (see Lévi-Strauss 1966, ch. 1).
Yaminahua represents anything but an exception in this fascinating landscape, presenting a good many interesting features susceptible of being glossed. Yet I would like to concentrate on its complex semiotic system, multilayered rhetoric, and reverberating semantics –
and, more concretely, on the peculiar status of the “twisted language” (Townsley 1993;
Aikhenvald 2012:365–66) or “twisted words” (Townsley 1987) (literally: tsai yoshtoyoshto, “language twisting twisting” or “twice-twisted language”) characteristic of the Yaminahua shamanic curing song or koshuiti.
There are two studies on this unique linguistic phenomenon, both by Townsley (1987
and 1993, the latter being mostly a slight re-elaboration of the former). More recently Aikhenvald (2012:365–66) has briefly referred to it as well. The following analysis is based on
Townsley’s ethnography, which may be deemed outdated in the sense that it no longer reflects the circumstances under which the Yaminahua communities live, i.e., from a current
ethnographic standpoint, but it remains crucial to understand the complexity and richness of
the language that the Yaminahua fight to preserve today as one of their major identity markers (Merelis et al. 2010).
What shamans actually do, more than anything else, is sing. Singing is by far
the most important shamanic activity and is considered by the Yaminahua
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to be the vehicle for all shamanic powers. It is through his songs that a
shaman claims to be able to cure illness and to influence the world in a variety of ways. The songs (kushuiti) are usually sung under the influence of an
hallucinogenic brew (shori) made from lianas of the banisteriopsis and the
shrub psychotria viridis [ayahuasca].
. . . [Thus w]hat a shaman actually does when he cures, is sing. His singing
will be intermittently accompanied by the blowing of tobacco smoke on the
patient or a more rapid, vigorous and staccato blowing onto the crown of
the patient’s head, but the effective healing power is thought to originate in
the song. The blowing effects a sort of physical transfer of the meaning and
power of the song into the patient. (Townsley 1987:3, 9)
This immediately shows the powerful role of language among the Yaminahua. Yet it is the
elusive (Townsley: “elliptical”) language of the koshuiti that is worth considering here.
Townsley adds:
These songs are elaborately metaphoric, in two quite distinct ways. They
make very little direct reference to the illness or to the real situation which
the song is intended to influence. Instead they seem to create elaborate
analogies to it. Confronted by an illness, a shaman sings a song to the sun,
to the moon, to an animal, or perhaps he chants a myth. This is the first
way in which these songs are metaphoric: the overall form of the song as a
whole is constituted by an extended analogy to the real context of the
song’s performance. (Townsley 1987:3)
There is, however, (fold after fold, so to speak) a second way in which the shamanic Sprechgesang is metaphoric: not now in relation to the pre-linguistic context (A) to which the song refers analogically through its first metaphorical register (B) but in relation to the analogical
register itself, thus establishing a supplementary metaphorical register (C) that overlaps with
B) and complicates (duplicates) the referentiality of the words themselves. A is the given situation the shaman confronts; B is what he “sees,” i.e., the content of his vision, which
thereby substitutes A (first fold, first metaphorical register) by an “external analogy” (Townsley ibid.); C is the actual words the shaman uses to (indirectly) refer to B (second fold, second metaphorical register) by means of what Townsley calls, in contrast, “standardized
internal metaphors,” for
none of the things importantly referred to in the song [B] should be indicated by their proper names. To give but a few examples: all trees are referred
to as “tapirs” – different types of tree are indicated by qualifications such as
“big-sitting-tapir” or “pungent-tapir”; all fish are referred to as “while-collar
peccaries” and distinguished by similar qualifications; anacondas are referred to as “hammocks”; rivers become “anacondas”; rain becomes “bigcold-lean-to”; tobacco becomes “shaman-hawk-wings”; jaguars become
“baskets,” etc.3
These metaphors seem to be remarkably standardized and were understood by all shamans, even those from widely separated communities who
had had no personal contact, in the same way. Being standardized one
might assume that they were not consciously metaphoric usages at all but
simply culturally fixed equivalents which were learnt and employed automatically with no awareness of the metaphor. This is not so. In every instance that I came across the logic of these metaphors, as metaphors, could
be explained by shamans with no hesitation. In every case the basic sense of
the usages was carried by some resemblance, usually visual, between the
song-word [C] and its referent [B]. Thus fish become white-collar peccaries
because of the resemblance between a fish gill and the white dashes on this
type of peccary’s neck which give it its name; jaguars become a particular
type of basket because this basket (wonati) is loosely woven with large gaps
between the fibres that can be seen as similar to the pattern of a jaguar’s
70

Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America

markings; rivers are anacondas because the winding course of a river resembles the snake’s sinuous movements, and so on. Basic visual resemblances are often qualified by other references. Thus tobacco is a “shamanhawk-wings” because tobacco leaves are seen to resemble a hawk’s wing.
Rain is “big-cold-lean-to” because the slating sheets of rain in a downpour
resemble the slanting roofs of the lean-tos which the Yaminahua build for
shelter when away from their village; rain is also cold. (Townsley 1987:10)
Besides, there is always here room for “improvisation and creativity” (Townsley 1987:15).
The reason for these “internal metaphors” or, as the shamans themselves call them,
“twisted words” (tsai yoshtoyoshto)—put differently: the purpose of this impressive “metaphorical recursiveness”4—is beautifully made clear, moreover, by one of Townsley’s informants:
“With my koshuiti I want to see—singing I carefully examine things—tsai yoshtoyoshto bring
me close to things but not too close—with normal words I would crash into things—normal
words are no good —with tsai yoshtoyoshto I circle around things – I see them clearly”
(Townsley 1987:11). In other words, “internal metaphors” must substitute the “external
analogy;” the shaman must replace B with, or circle it through, C to keep control of the vision itself—both perceptively, i.e., theoretically, and pragmatically. Thus Townsley (1987:16)
seems to be right in his observation:
They seem to be figurative devices considered to have a pragmatic function
not in terms of the external world but in terms of the shaman’s own vision.
Shamanic discourse seems to reveal the idea that they are simply necessary
to create and sustain the sort of visionary precision which shamanism
claims for itself . . . .
In everyday language the Yaminahua often make use of metaphor and
word-play in jokes and are obviously aware that in these contexts their metaphors are incorrect names, and a playful use of language. In the context of
shamanism however the use of metaphor becomes the only correct means
of precise identification.5 (Townsley 1987:16)
Yaminahua shamans need to be precise because they need to be effective to cure—their “external analogies” aiming, e.g., at linking a physiological disorder to a regular natural event so
as to symbolically dissolve the troubling outcome of the former into the regularity of the latter and hence mitigate its unwanted effects (see the example and analysis in Townsley
1987:12–14). The percentage of efficient cures is remarkably high, and most cures likely involve a psychosomatic component, although this paper is no place to ponder it.6
For our purpose it is important to stress (1) the idea of “metaphorical recursiveness”; (2)
the “baroque” (or Borgean, one could argue) folding of the common binary structure (x)
things + (y) words into the threefold scheme:
things + metaphors1 + metaphors2
=
(A) things + (B) external analogies + (C) internal metaphors
In this structure the signifier B becomes the signified of a new signifier C while not losing its
condition of signifier of a signified A that gets, in turn, an additional signifier C not signified,
however, by a new (third) signifier—which means the “recursiveness” thus displayed is “limited”; (3) this entails a “reverberating semantics” as much as a “multilayered rhetoric”; and
(4) that all this presupposes an extraordinarily complex, if relatively oblique, multi-iconic
sign-system of the type:7
A ≈ [B] ≈ C
which is finally reduced to an indexical sign-system of the type:
A ← [B]
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I conclude this analysis in agreement with Townsley (1993:466) that this peculiar use of metaphors shows that Yaminahua traditional “cosmology, far from being a complete and readyconstituted system of things known [was and] is [still to a certain extent perhaps], for the
Yaminahua themselves . . . a system in the making, never finished and always provisional.”
This does not mean that Yaminahua or any other Amazonian languages are imprecise in any
way, as most of them have different markers of evidentiality for statements that refer to
things directly perceived by the senses (indistinctly or privileging the vision over the others
senses), things merely assumed by the speaker, things conjectured and/or inferred, reported
things (be it through secondhand or thirdhand reports) to which the speaker is no direct
witness, and things simply known to everyone, i.e., things of general knowledge; the incorporation of most such markers is sometimes obligatory in the everyday speech (Aikhenvald
2004, 2012:350–59).7 It means the Yaminahua semiotize the world in a creative polyvalent
fashion, thus avoiding the trap of subsuming content and expression under a closed semiotic
circuit—or into what Guattari (2016:165–66) called a “signifying” semiotics.

Animism, Totemism, and Analogism; or, the Ternary Basis of Traditional
Yaminahua Binary Cosmology
I shall now examine a feature of the Yaminahua worldview in which, once again, a binary
structure becomes ternary, or is somehow subordinated to a threefold taxonomy. But first I
must open a brief conceptual parenthesis.
In a groundbreaking and elegantly written monograph titled Beyond Nature and Culture
which Claude Lévi-Strauss (2005) welcomed as “giv[ing] to anthropological reflection a new
starting point” and Sahlins (2013:xii) hailed as a “paradigm shift” in the “current anthropological trajectory,” Descola (2013) famously distinguishes four different ways we may map
nature and culture—“we” meaning here all human cultures—be it by delimiting their supposed boundaries as being external to one another or by complicating any attempt to trace a
clear-cut divide between them. These different worldviews he calls:
(a) animism—though he moves beyond Tylor’s derogatory use of such term to denote the belief in souls or spirits proper of “lower races” due to their incapability of telling “man . . .
[from] beast . . . and plants or even objects” (Harvey 2017:8);
(b) totemism—which he takes in turn from Lévi-Strauss’s (1964) redefinition as a “classificatory” or “categorizing” attitude that articulates the social, the personal, and the natural along
reciprocal principles, while simultaneously attributing it with a more straightforwardly ontological quality (Descola 2013:144);
(c) analogism—which roughly coincides with Foucault’s (1970) concept of analogy as the premodern episteme of Western culture, albeit expanding it beyond such rather narrow temporal and geographical boundaries; and
(d) naturalism—which he equates with the very type of mechanicist take on the world distinctive of modern (i.e., Galilean, Cartesian, and Newtonian) science.
In the first case (a) all or most “things” are endowed with a living principle of their own
(which is the reason why, e.g., many native American languages have “animated” and “unanimated” genres accompanying their nouns and verbs); thus one can say most of them share
in common an embodied “interiority,” whereas they differ as in terms of their “embodiments,” to which different lived, experienced worlds (Lebenswelten) correspond in turn.9 An
example of this worldview is the widespread Amazonian belief that before the “ethnographic
present” all differences chaotically communicated with one another so that most animals,
plants, geographical features, meteorological phenomena, and celestial bodies were externally
as “human” as men still are, but they lost their human physicality due to their many ontological becomings, through which they morphed into the biological species and other beings
and realities that form the present world (Danowksi and Viveiros de Castro 2017:63–64).
According to this view, therefore, “what we call “environment” is . . . a society of societies,
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an international arena, a cosmopoliteia” (69)—a term I will use abundantly in this paper. Conversely, in the fourth case, (d) what all living things have in common is their equal belonging
to “nature,” with humankind representing the only exception to this rule insofar as humans
have managed to develop something else: apart from nature, and in opposition to it, they also have “culture,” which makes them different and justifies their privileged position in a
cosmos they attempt to conquer against all possible natural constraints and limitations. “Totemism” (b) differs from these two worldviews in that it establishes a full, i.e., a twofold—if
in another sense somewhat-restricted—continuity: natural and cultural. In this case the different human groups share their interiority and their embodiment or physicality with the different animal species (one or more per human group) whose respective precosmological
archetypes are ontologically responsible for the production of the different observable ecosystems in nature. These have been instituted through a series of differential and creative
cosmological events. Lastly, in the fourth case (c) nature and culture differ from one species
to another and from one reality to another, so that de rigueur one can only speak of an irreducible multiplicity: the world as an infinite collection of singularities. Yet it is simultaneously possible to associate some things with others due to their similar qualities or states of
being, i.e., by applying to them the principle of analogy, which thereby allows the ideal portrayal of the world as a web of more-or-less evident or secret relations. Thus Descola
(2013:122) summarizes the major differences existing between such worldviews or “ontologies” (201):10
Similar interiorities
Dissimilar physicalities
Dissimilar interiorities
Similar physicalities

Animism

Totemism

Similar interiorities
Similar physicalities

Naturalism

Analogism

Dissimilar interiorities
Dissimilar physicalities

And note that in the case of “naturalism” all natural beings presenting “similar physicalities”
means they have in common needs like nurture and biological reproduction, they are all born
biologically, and they can all die, etc. Moreover, “naturalism” is “anthropocentric” as much
as “animism” is “anthropomorphic,” to concur with Déborah Danowski and Viveiros de
Castro (2017:69ff.): from an “animist” perspective the concept of “humanity” does not denote a specific biological species but an extensive, i.e., trans-species, “condition.”
In discussing animism11 Descola (1996:88) remarks that it may eventually combine with
totemism, for example in the case of the Bororo, whereas Danowski and Viveiros de Castro
(2017:138) follow Sahlins (2014) in arguing that their difference “is not very clear and possibly not very meaningful” (see also Viveiros de Castro 2009, 2012a, 2015:230–35). As for
“analogism” and “naturalism,” Descola envisages them as representing two radically different options, notwithstanding the fact that they have occasionally coexisted, and coexist even
today in Europe in the juxtaposition of science and astrology in the minds of many Europeans. Therefore, he defines these four “ontologies”—the theorizing of which represents a
very notable contribution to contemporary anthropology and philosophy alike—as being exterior to one another.12
Following Townsley’s ethnography of the complexity and richness of Yaminahua ontologies I challenge Descola’s view regarding ontology boundedness. Although, Townsley’s
ethnography as apropos their language no longer reflects the circumstances under which the
Yaminahua live it remains nonetheless crucial. For within the traditional Yaminahua
worldview animism, totemism, and analogism can be said not only to have coexisted but to
have intertwined in a complex ternary system that made possible the dualism characteristic
of most Amazonian ontologies.13 This binary matrix relying on a ternary system (and hence
presenting a two-part arithmetics that Viveiros de Castro [2012b] has explored from a different perspective) is another outstanding feature of the traditional Yaminahua (and more
broadly Amazonian) “baroque” mind. Townsley (1994:214–40), who extensively and accurately describes Yaminahua binary logic, offers a tentative functional hypothesis of its genealogy (ibid.:230, 235–40, 244, 246) in an attempt to overcome what he sees as Lévi-Strauss’s
too-“static” reading of Amazonian binary logic. However he fails to perceive this crucial
arithmetic co-implication (↔):
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2↔3
Here the latter component (i.e., the ternary system) plays a (literally) “transcendental” role (in
the Kantian sense) insofar as it establishes the conditions of possibility of the first component (i.e., the basal binary logic). Therefore, the ternary system forms a structure that is inherently connected to a basal binary structure, for which reason their connection forms a
first macrostructure; “first” because, as shown later, this macrostructure intersects (∩) with
another one (fourfold this time). Notice that we are moving here on a relational level different from that of the aforementioned co-implication. Every individual (if it makes sense to
speak of individuals)14 within the fourfold relational level is simultaneously (i.e., synchronically) integrated into space, time, society, and the cosmos. In the end,
{2 ↔ 3} ∩ 4.
Put differently: a binary opposition conceals a ternary system, and they somehow unfold into
a parallel quaternary system. Let us now consider these three steps successively.

1) The Basal Binary Structure of the Yaminahua Cosmopoliteia; or, the Division of the Real into Two Opposite but Complementary Ontological Classes
Like most Amazonian (and many non-Amazonian premodern) worlds the Yaminahua is a
binary universe. Everything that exists falls under one of two classificatory categories, as all
reality (be it corporeal, social, cosmological, etc.) divides into two opposite but complementary halves. These halves take the form of moieties roa and dawa when such division applies
to the social. The former comprises all things that like the tribal “chiefs,” who due to their
age prove wiser than the other men and whose wisdom and persuasive rhetoric grant stability and durability to the community, may be said to belong to the very center of the latter.
They are hence “inner” to it like the women, the children, and the elder in contrast to the
young hunters and warriors, and they are therefore too “white” or “colorless,” “big,” “soft,”
“humid” or “belonging to the water,” and “of intense smell” as well as “archetypal” or “belonging to the sky” like, e.g., the “royal vulture,” above which no other animal can fly. The
latter are the “shamans” who communicate with the “others,” i.e., the spirits of the dead,
plus all things that are “external,” “black” or “colorful,” “small,” “hard,” “dry” or “belonging to the earth,” and “aromatic” as well as similar to the young warrior, like the “jaguar.”
And just as it can be affirmed that everything (from names to sizes and colors and other
physical qualities to spatial positions and ecosystems, from animals and humans to sociocosmological roles and groups) belongs to one of these two classes, it must also be stressed
that humans permanently circulate through one another by marriage, as each human person
(for humans are not the only true persons in the Yaminahua world) must espouse another
one belonging to the opposite class.
There is little need to stress that sociality consists in such alliance and that reciprocity is
its rule; thus all social forms that betray it should be somehow viewed as deviant (Segovia
2019). The same holds for the significance of kinship relations from an anthropological perspective (Sahlins 2006). Furthermore, those societies that do not betray it may be defined as
“serial,” since they consist of a number of binary series that echo, or rather express, a basal
dual logic: this “and” that; and one could suggest, following Lévi-Strauss and Pierre Clastres,
that the mechanism through which the binary opposition is expressed in such societies implies the “reciprocal subordination” of any two terms thus opposed, so that a hypothetical
primacy of any of them over its opposite (and hence the creation of a sphere of power separated from the social and against the unity of the social) is prevented—whence Clastres’s
well-known and precise definition: “societies against the state.” In short, the social is neither
subsumed into the rule of One nor divided into the multiplicity of the Many; i.e., it forms
neither a state with its characteristic vertical subordination nor a (neo)liberal playground for
individual competition. Yet it does not reflect the struggle of Two—a struggle that would
only come to an end when one of the opponents manages, first, to defeat its opponent, and
then finally to dissolve all imaginable division in the all-encompassing substance of a
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(re)new(ed) One: the social is here instead, to paraphrase Gilles Deleuze, a world made of
“disjunctive syntheses.”
Figure 1 below shows how this dual organization has been progressively lost in many
Yaminahua settlements, which used to reflect it as well but have undergone over the past
decades a gradual atomization, thus displaying the globalized/colonial Western model of a
mononuclear family (composed of a few highly individualized members). I distinguish three
phases (i, ii, iii), of which the second (ii), based on the spatial redistribution of the uxorilocal
“extended domestic unit” (EDU) formed by an old couple, their daughters, and their daughters’ husbands and premarried children plus eventually some of the old couple’s divorced or
even married sons with their own families, represents the transition between the traditional
binary model (i) with its two well-defined “malocas” (M) or communal houses (with their
typical two doors for men and women, respectively) that persisted until approximately, the
third quarter of the past century, and the current model (iii) based on the segregation of the
“nuclear families” (NF) that were earlier constitutive of each EDU, which significantly includes a modern school (S).

Figure 1. Atomization of the Traditional Yaminahua Settlement
It is interesting to note that if, according to the traditional Yaminahua (and more broadly
Amazonian) view the whole cosmos partakes in this fundamental binary division that provides its infrastructure to all reality, it is less because there would be something beyond the
social but that is organized in the same way than because the cosmos itself proves to be social in all its layers. In fact, from the traditional Yaminahua standpoint sociality is a continuum that exceeds what we (but only we) would label as “human.” To put it succinctly:
everything falls under one of the two aforementioned categories or classes because there is
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nothing beyond the cosmopolitical web in which the world consists, from the royal vulture
and the jaguar to the Yaminahua themselves.

2) An Underlying Ternary System; or, the Transcendental Structure behind
the Basal Binary Structure of the Yaminahua Cosmopoliteia
But how is such a twofold division made? In other words, what are its formal or logical conditions of possibility? There are three, I posit. First, beings are grouped in two classes according, first and foremost, to their “inner,” albeit simultaneously embodied, qualities, which
in turn requires that they be all provided with an embodied “animated” principle or (for lack
of a better term) “soul” (yoshi) responsible (as their “cause”) for their “particular characteristics” (Townsley 1994:215). This amounts to adopting, as I have formerly underlined, an “animist” perspective. Secondly, this in turn demands that certain analogies be established
among each being’s characteristics, for otherwise it would not be feasible to group them
within a category. “Softness,” or “hardness,” for instance, must be shared by a number of
them, and the same can be said of any other opposing traits: they must be identified in these
particular beings (in the plural, therefore) as being characteristic of them all, whereas other
beings present opposite characteristics. But is this not to posit, alongside an animist take on
things, their association by virtue of their analogies—and hence to establish “analogism” as a
complementary principle? Thirdly, is it not true that, as a consequence, all things grouped in
the same class share those very qualities that make them far more similar to one another
than they are to the things gathered in the opposite class, so that members, say, of one of the
two social moieties into which Yaminahua society divides resemble their respective totems—
the royal vulture or the jaguar, respectively—more than they resemble members of the other
social moiety, which are nevertheless their potential affines? And is this not, in last analysis,
the very principle of “totemism?”

Figure 2. Transcendental Ternary System Underlying the Cosmopoliteia Binary
This, in sum, means “animism,” “analogism” and “totemism” (to use Descola’s terms)
do not only overlap but also fuse into one another; and that rather than being exterior to
each other, these three “ontologies” (as Descola calls them) can eventually, and do indeed
often, combine (do not many “savage” cosmologies bear witness to their combination?) into
a single ternary system without which the basal binary division I have explored in the preceding paragraphs would remain unimaginable. Therefore, we can illustrate the relations within a
ternary system as in figure 2 (see above).
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This is not something exclusive to the Yaminahua, however. In fact, I am formulating a
somewhat recurrent structural pattern, according to which any distributive binary division of
the type x, y, and z belong in Class A, while m, n, and p belong in Class B, necessarily operates on a dual, both “animist” and “analogical,” distributive basis (if x, y, and z belong in
Class A it is due to their inner, if embodied, qualitative similarities, and the very same applies
to m, n, and p within Class B). This, in turn, connects the member in each class, including
humans and their respective “totems.” Thus, for example, as Lévi-Strauss (1966:39) observes
after Dieterlen (1950), among the Dogon of Sudan natural and biological phenomena, body
parts, social classes, techniques, and institutions are typologically correlated. More precisely,
their multi-arithmetic taxonomical system consists of twenty-two main plant families, some
of which are further divided into eleven subgroups, all subdivided into three regular subcategories and grouped into two major classes that stand in inverse relationship to one another
and are extensive regarding various sensible qualities, types of births, biological sexes, body
parts, social classes, techniques, and institutions. Analogy and totemism are reciprocally at
play here, but in a way in which through them everything becomes not only linked but also
alive, i.e., animated, in specific ways, with all things simultaneously sharing embodiment and
interiority with other things. Likewise, Barbara Glowczewski (2007) notices that totemism,
analogism, and animism often go hand in hand in Australia.

3) A Parallel Quaternary System; or, the Intersecting Structure That Makes
Possible the Integration of all Yaminahua People into the Four Dimensions of
Space, Time, Society, and the Cosmos
Finally, I would like to argue that if, by virtue of their embodied inner qualities, all things are
integrated into the cosmos, in the sense that they are incorporated in one of the two ontological classes into which the world divides, in the case of humans such cosmic integration
depends on their lineage. The latter expresses, so to speak, an essence or living principle, and
thus ultimately amounts to its embodiment. Additionally, their lineage or physical heredity
(i.e., their consanguinity) provides the Yaminahua their yora, or collective body, a body
shared (for no term exists that denotes the individual body), therefore; and in this way they
are also integrated (literally: see the drawing of the traditional settlement above) into spatiality. Simultaneously, their exogamy forces the Yaminahua to marry someone belonging to the
opposite social moiety, thus allowing all members of the group to actively partake in the very
foundation of the social qua alliance. Lastly, the way in which all proper names are distributed and replicated in alternate generations (the grandsons always receive the names of their
grandparents, which are thereby kept within the moiety to which they belong), while integrating the Yaminahua into both society and the cosmos in a different manner, incorporates
them too into a realm of time that is permanent and stable, i.e., synchronic; thus Townsley
(1994:213) observes that Yaminahua generations, rather than falling under the logic of “descent,” fall under that of “replacement,” which permits them to live, I dare add, in a Nietzschean “eternal return” where infinite intensive differences happen to unendingly express
other prior and more basic differences—“difference and repetition,” therefore, to paraphrase Deleuze. Arguably, then, we have:

Figure 3. Co-implied Time/Space/Society/Cosmos Dimensions
With full correspondence and circulation between such co-implied dimensions there can be
neither time without space nor cosmos without society; the cosmos is, in turn, contained like
society in space and time, and these provide extension and rhythm to the former.
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Conclusion
Examining the “twisted” rhetoric of Yaminahua shamanic songs allows one to understand
how complex and polyvalent semiotic systems can be. It also shows how diverse the relations between words and things prove in different cultural contexts. More specifically, what I
have labeled “metaphorical recursiveness” suggests the figure of a twofold, both ternary and
binary, folding of language and reality in which the referent is circumvallated if not completely elided. Finally, it calls one’s attention to the fact that the differential component of
indigenous languages is not only to be found in their semantics or syntax but also in their
rhetoric, i.e., in their use or performance.
On the other hand, the ontological classifications of the Yaminahua reveal a likewise
imbricate structure that is simultaneously binary, ternary, and quaternary: binary concerning
the overall classification of all things in two classes; ternary in the sense that such classification, based as it is in the extensive distribution of embodied inner qualities, brings together
animist, totemic, and analogist features often thought to form independent worldviews; and
quaternary because it makes possible the integration of the Yaminahua in time, space, society, and the cosmos in connection to a number of endogamic and exogamic distinctions.
Combined, the two things show ethnology still needs today as much theory as it always
has. Furthermore it is possible to add that, to some extent, shamanic songs stand on the two
sides of the famous theoretical divide analyzed by Lévi-Strauss in La Pensée sauvage (1966:32–
33): while their “twisted” rhetoric aims at producing specific events by means of a given semiotic structure, the Yaminahua ontological classifications they express organize sets of
events (since everything is alive in any indigenous context) in structural fashion.

Notes
1 The

most complete Yaminahua grammars are those by Norma Faust and Eugene E. Loos
(2002) and Eakin (1991), whereas the most complete (if the author acknowledges it as provisional) lexicon is André-Marcel D’Ans (1972) despite its relative antiquity.
2 On ideophones and interspecies relationality in indigenous contexts, see Segovia 2020.
3A possible analogy would be Mahler’s Das Lied von der Erde, with its “two coexistent motifs,
one melodic, evoking the assemblages of the bird, the other rhythmic, evoking the deep,
eternal breathing of the earth” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:339), but as we shall see, unlike
the romantic artist the shaman does not end up lost in his disjunctive journey.
4 Cf. Wagner’s 1978, 1986:xi) notion of “obviation.”
5 “It is likely that something similar occurs in the [Arawak] Piro case,” writes Peter Gow
(2001:145), “for the corresponding Piro category would seem to be koschepiru, ‘the words of a
song,’ deriving from koscheta, ‘to guess, to divine’ (Matteson 1965:346). The same word root,
-sche-, also generates the term, gischega, ‘a curl’, which suggests a basic similarity between
Yaminahua and Piro conceptualization of shamanic song imagery.” On possible similarities
in the Arawak Tariana, Kurripaco, and the Carib Kalapalo shamamic chants, see Aikhenvald
2012:366. On the circumlocutions of mestizo shamanic songs in the Upper Amazon, see
Beyer 2009:76.
6 There would be little mystery to such possibility, however; for as Oltmanns and Emery
(2014:227) remark “Medical scientists now view every physical illness—from colds to cancer
to AIDS—as a product of the interaction between the mind and body.” Eduardo Viveiros
de Castro (2013:29) makes a somewhat complementary point when he contends that the
shaman’s bell is a “particle accelerator”—no metaphor implied. See also Giraldo Herrera
2018.
7 Here I respectfully disagree with Townsley (1987:17) who holds that cognitive constructionism rather than semiotic theory is the apt frame in which to interpret shamanic metaphors. Paraphrasing Eco’s (1976:3–5) classical definition of semiotic theory, I take it be the
theory of sign production and the sign-based cultural codes that generate specific signfunctions.
8 I am grateful to Anne McCabe (Saint Louis University) for her helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this section of my paper.
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9 Cf.

the parallel concepts of “perspectivism” and “multinaturalism” in Viveiros de Castro
1998 and 2014:49–75), which goes far beyond the timid recovering of the term “animism”
by Nurit Bird-David (1999) and Graham Harvey (2017) [after A. Irving Hallowell (1960)].
10 Descola (2011) also includes abundant visual illustrations of these four ontologies.
11 For the reutilization of animism in the social sciences and the ecological humanities, see
Pedersen and Willerslev 2012; Harvey 2013; Kohn 2013; Brightman, Grotti and Ulturgasheva 2012.
12 One can compare Descola’s conclusions with Morten A. Pedersen’s (2001) study on “animist” and “totemic” Asian cultures.
13 As Claude Lévi-Strauss showed, dualism, i.e., the division of the real into two opposite albeit complementary categories has very little to do with our common, dramatic understanding of such a term.
14 On whether premodern Amazonians were/are not individuals see, e.g., Falleiros 2017.

References
Aikhenvald, Alexandra Y.
2004 Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2012 The Languages of the Amazon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beyer, Stephan V.
2009 Singing to the Plants: A Guide to Mestizo Shamanism in the Upper Amazon. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Bird-David, Nurit
1999 ‘“Animism’ Revisited: Personhood, Environment, and Relational Epistemology.” Current Anthropology 40(suppl):67–91.
Blaser, Mario
2013 “Ontological Conflicts and the Stories of Peoples in Spite of Europe: Toward a Conversation on Political Ontology.” Current Anthropology 54/5: 547–
68.
Brightman, Marc, Vanessa Grotti, and Olga Ulturgasheva (eds)
2012 Animism In Rainforest And Tundra: Personhood, Animals, Plants and Things in
Contemporary Amazonia and Siberia. New York: Berghahn.
D’ans, André-Marcel
1972 Léxico Yaminahua (Pano). Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.
Danowski, Déborah and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro
2017 The Ends of the World. Cambridge: Polity Press. [orig. 2014]
Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari
1987 A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. New York: Continuum.
[orig. 1980]
Descola, Philippe
1996 “Constructing Natures: Symbolic Ecology and Social Practice.” In Philippe
Descola and Gisli Pálsson (eds), Nature and Society: Anthropological Perspectives.
London: Routledge, pp. 82–102.
2013 Beyond Nature and Culture. Trans. Janet Lloyd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [orig. 2005]
Descola, Philippe (ed)
2011 La Fabrique des images. Visions du monde et formes de la représentation. Lyon:
Musée du Quai Branly and Somogy Éditions d’Art.
Dieterlen, Germaine
1950 “Les Correspondances cosmo-biologiques chez les Soudanais.” Journal de
Psychologie normale et pathologie 43(3):350–66.
Dixon, Robert M. W. & Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald
1999 “Introduction.” In R. M. W. Dixon and A. Y. Aikhenvald (eds), The Amazonian Languages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eakin, Lucille
1991 Lecciones para el aprendizaje del idioma Yaminahua. Lima: Ministerio de Educación/Yarinacocha, Pucallpa, Peru: Instituto Lingüistico de Verano. Documentos de Trabajo. Nº 22.
79

Yaminahua Language and Worldview

Eco, Umberto
1976 A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. [orig. 1975]
Epps, Patricia and Andrés Pablo Salanova
2013 “The Languages of Amazonia.” Tipití 11(1):1–27.
Everett, Daniel
2008 Don’t Sleep, There are Snakes: Life and Language in the Amazonian Jungle. London: Profile Books.
Falleiros, Guilherme
2017 “Notas para uma crítica anarco-Indígena ao indivíduo / Notas para una crítica anarco-Indígena al individuo,” Palimpsestos: revista de arqueología y antropología anarquista Nº 0-Year 1:189–225.
Faust, Norma and Eugene E. Loos
2002 Gramática del idioma yaminahua. Lima: Instituto Lingüístico de Verano.
Fleck, David W.
2013 Panoan Languages and Linguistics. New York: American Museum of Natural
History.
Foucault, Michel
1970 The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York: Pantheon
Books. [orig. 1966]
Giraldo Herrera, César
2018 “Shamanic Microscopy: Cellular Souls, Microbial Spirits.” Anthropology of
Consciousness 29(1):8–43.
Glowczewski, Barbara
2007 “The Paradigm of Indigenous Australians: Anthropological Phantasms, Artistic Creations, and Political Resistance.” In Lucienne Strivay and Géraldine Le Roux (eds), The Revenge of Genres. Australian Contemporary Art. Paris:
Editions Aïnu, 84–108.
Gow, Peter
2001 An Amazonian Myth and its History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Guattari, Félix
2016 Lines of Flight: For Another World of Possibilities. London: Bloomsbury. [orig.
2011]
Hallowell, A. Irving
1960 “Ojibwa Ontology, Behaviour, and Worldview.” In Stanley Diamond (ed)
Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 19–52.
Harvey, Graham
2017 Animism: Respecting the Living World. 2nd ed. London: Hurst & Co.
Harvey, Graham (ed)
2013 The Handbook of Contemporary Animism. London: Routledge.
Kohn, Eduardo
2013 How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology beyond the Human. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude
1964 Totemism. London: Merlin Press. [orig. 1962]
1966 The Savage Mind. London: Widenfeld & Nicolson. [orig. 1962]
2005 Promotional blurb on Philippe Descola Par-delà nature et culture. Paris: Éditions Gallimard.
Matteson, Esther L.
1965 The Piro (Arawakan) Language. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Merelis, Ana, Manuel Rodríguez, Mariana Rodríguez, Francisco Gonzales, Joel González and
Durimar Merelis
2010 RSCSCMTY/Registro de saberes, conocimientos, sabidurías, cosmovisiones, relacionados con la Madre Tierra del pueblo Yaminahua
Ministerio de Educación: Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia.
http://biblioteca.minedu.gob.bo/biblio/electronic-book/1205

80

Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America

Nuckolls, Janis B.
1996 Sounds like Life: Sound-symbolic Grammar, Performance, and Cognition in Pastaza
Quechua. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2010 ‘The Sound-Symbolic Expression of Animacy in Amazonian Ecuador.” Diversity 2:353–369.
2012 “Ideophones in Bodily Experiences in Pastaza Quichua (Ecuador).” Proceedings of the 2011 Symposium for Teaching and Learning Indigenous Languages of Latin America (STLILLA). Indiana: University of Notre Dame.
Nuckolls, Janis B., Tod Swanson, Alex Rice, Diana Sun and Sarah Hatton
2015 Ideophone-gesture composites: depictive type, sensory class, and modality.
Program with extended abstracts for the Linguistic Society of America Annual Meeting, Portland, Oregon, January 7–11. (4 pages)
Pedersen, Morten A.
2001 “Totemism, Animism, and North Asian Indigenous Ontologies.” Journal of
the Royal Anthropological Institute 7(3):411–27
Pedersen, Morten A. and Rane Willerslev
2012 ‘“The Soul of the Soul is the Body’: Rethinking the Concept of Soul
through North Asian Ethnography.” Common Knowledge 18(3):464–86.
Sahlins, Marshall
2006 “The Western Illusion of Human Nature.” Michigan Quarterly Review 45(3):
454–83.
2013 “Foreward.” In Philippe Descola. Beyond Nature and Culture. Trans. Janet
Lloyd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2014 “On the Ontological Scheme of Beyond Nature and Culture.” HAU: Journal
of Ethnographic Theory 4(1):281–90.
Segovia, Carlos
2019 “Re-theorising the Social and Its Models after Lévi-Strauss’s and Pierre
Clastres’s Study of Stateless Social Assemblages.” Anarchist Studies 27(2):
forthcoming “Ontologies and Ecologies of the Otherwise: Notes on Postdevelopment Practices in Malawi.” In J. Pedro-Caraña, E. HerreraHuérfano and J. Ochoa-Almanza (eds), Communication Justice in the Pluriverse:
A Dialogue towards the Planetarization of Experiences.
Townsley, Graham
1987 “Metaphors and the Unseen: The Shamanic Use of Verbal Metaphor
amongst the Yaminahua of Southeastern Peru.” Cambridge Journal of Anthropology 12(2):1–17.
1994 “Los Yaminahua.” In Fernando Santos Granero and Frederica Barclay
(eds), Guía Etnográfica de la Alta Amazonia. Vol. 2. Quito: FLACSO-Sede
Ecuador and IFEA, pp. 239–360.
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo
1998 “Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism.” Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute 4(3):469–488.
2009 Perspectivisme et animisme: débat avec Philippe Descola. Maison Suger,
Paris,
January
30.
Video.
<https://www.canalu.tv/video/fmsh/perspectivisme_et_animisme_debat_avec_philippe_desco
la.30901>.
2012a Cosmological Perspectivism in Amazonia and Elsewhere. Masterclass Series 1.
Manchester:
Hau
Network
of
Ethnographic
Theory.
<http://haubooks.org/cosmological-perspectivism-in-amazonia>.
2012b Radical Dualism: A Meta-Fantasy on the Square Root of Dual Organizations, or, A
Savage Homage to Lévi-Strauss/Radikaler Dualismus: Eine Meta- Fantasie über die
Quadratwurzel dualer Organisationen, oder, Eine wilde Hommage an Lévi-Strauss.
Ostfildern, Germany: Hatje Cantz.
2013 La mirada del jaguar: introducción al perspectivismo amerindio. Entrevistas. Buenos
Aires: Tinta Limón. [orig. 2008]
2014 Cannibal Metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. [orig.
2009]
81

Yaminahua Language and Worldview

2015
Wagner, Roy
1978
1986

The Relative Native: Essays on Indigenous Conceptual Worlds. Chicago: HAU
Books.
Lethal Speech: Daribi Myth as Symbolic Obviation. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Symbols that Stand for Themselves. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

82

